The Thai-Cambodia border dispute has made clear that ASEAN member states are not beyond armed conflict with each other. This, however, disrupts trade and integrated supply chains, highlighting risks baked into ASEAN frameworks that could prove problematic for the bloc moving forward.
In the 1950s, the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the European Union, was founded under the principle that if France and Germany were to share a steel and coal market, it would make armed conflict, in the words of French foreign minister Robert Schuman, “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”
This was followed, in 1967, by the establishment of ASEAN, looking to do something similar in Southeast Asia, in pursuit of peace and regional security.
But of course, the two supranational bodies went on to develop very differently.
Whereas the EU was built on shared Anglo-Saxon culture and values alongside economic integration, ASEAN’s development was much more singularly focused.
This was largely on account of different cultures, traditions, and political systems throughout the grouping, which made it difficult to create a shared identity.
That’s not to say people didn’t try.
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, famously argued that Asian states did indeed have a shared set of values, just that they were different from those in the West.
Those ‘Asian values’, as they would come to be known, put the interests of the family and the nation before those of the individual; framed human rights as subjective, with social and economic rights prioritised over political rights; and empowered sovereign states to manage their own internal affairs without fear of external interference.
Basically, Asia would embrace greater economic integration, but an each-to-their-own approach when it came to social and political development.
This has worked for some time now, too.
The ASEAN Trade in Goods and Services and ASEAN Free Trade Area agreements have significantly lifted intraregional trade.
Moreover, ASEAN has negotiated seven bilateral free trade agreements as a bloc and one multilateral agreement in the RCEP, boosting external trade.
At the same time, coups in Myanmar and Thailand have done little to stymie its economic progress.
That said, economic, political, and social development do not occur in isolation. They, too, are deeply integrated.
The closure of the border between Cambodia and Thailand over a political dispute, for example, has significant economic costs for not just businesses in both countries but third countries as well, particularly Vietnam.
Produce, for example, that might have transited from Vietnam to Thailand through Cambodia will need to either be shipped by sea freight or diverted through Laos, adding hundreds of kilometres, travel time, and additional costs.
Moreover, Cambodia’s ban on imported fuel from Thailand could significantly disrupt supplies in Vietnam.
As it stands, a litre of petrol in Cambodia is currently retailing for US$1.12, whereas in Vietnam, a litre of petrol is currently retailing at 74 US cents per litre.
Put another way, a litre of petrol purchased in Vietnam can be sold across the border at a 51 percent markup, creating a strong incentive for informal cross-border trade.
Moreover, the border closure creates friction in tourism, with common overland routes no longer accessible and tourists either being rerouted or missing key parts of their itinerary altogether.
On that note, Thailand has been pushing for a regional common tourism visa, which would include Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar to make travel between these countries easier. It’s difficult to see this progressing, on account of recent events, in the near future.
The point is that there is this conflict in the middle of an increasingly integrated economic bloc that will have ripple effects, but to which no institutions have been properly empowered to step in and arbitrate.
Moreover, this could be just the beginning.
As regional economies grow and demand for resources increases, what are relatively minor disputes now could become much bigger.
Cambodia, for example, is embarking on a canal project which could see a huge diversion of water from the Mekong, with the potential to significantly impact populations and the environment downstream in Vietnam.
Shared fishing grounds have also been known to cause conflict from time to time.
Myanmar fired on Thai fishing trawlers last year, and Indonesia has, on a few occasions, arrested Vietnamese fishermen and scuttled their boats.
And, of course, the South China Sea dispute isn’t just about China and the several Southeast Asian nations with which it has overlapping claims, but the overlapping claims of those Southeast Asian states too.
That is to say, the Thai-Cambodia border, as a geopolitical challenge for intraregional supply chains, may not be a one-off.
Bigger picture, ASEAN’s economic achievements are significant, but mask a lack of cohesion in the political and social spheres.
Without stronger dispute resolution frameworks and shared norms, the region’s growth story risks being undercut by unresolved tensions simmering beneath the surface.